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Abstract – As a ‘general principle’, good faith forms part of the sources of international 
law. Still not widely examined in relation to rights and obligations, the aim here is to 
demonstrate the specific characteristics of the principle. In general, international law rules 
such as pacta sunt servanda, abuse of rights, estoppel and acquiescence and the 
negotiation of disputes are grounded, to some extent, in good faith. In treaty law, good 
faith has various manifestations from the time prior to signature through to interpretation. 
These are outlined here. The article argues that good faith acts to mediate the effects of 
States’ rights in international law, in order to achieve acceptable results when competing 
interests exist. Fundamentally, good faith is a limitation of State sovereignty, albeit one 
that is necessary, as it protects other States and their trust and reliance in international 
law.   
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE TOPIC 
According to Art. 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute, the Court “shall apply the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations”. When treaties or 
customary law cannot yield a result, recourse is made to the general 
principles of law,1 of which good faith is perhaps the most important, as it 
underpins many international legal rules.2 The nature of good faith as an 
overarching legal principle makes it difficult to define in absolute terms.3 
This brings to mind the (in)famous quote of Justice Stewart of the US 
Supreme Court, who stated: “I shall not today attempt to define [it]...But I 
know it when I see it.”4 In this article the aim will not be to attempt an all-
encompassing definition of good faith, 5  but rather to describe and 
exemplify its place in international law.  
This article is in five parts. Firstly, it starts with an assessment of the 
                                                
* Ph.D. candidate and Research Assistant to Professor Stefan Talmon, D.Phil., LL.M., 
M.A., Institute for Public International Law of the University of Bonn. 
1 Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law Vol. 1, (ed Elihu Lauterpacht, CUP 1970) 68; 
Malcolm N Shaw, International Law, (6th edn, CUP 2008) 98; James Crawford, 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, (8th edn, OUP 2012) 134. 
2 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 253; Shaw (n 1) 
103; Michel Virally, ‘Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law’ (1983) 77 
AJIL 130.  
3 William Tetley, ‘Good Faith in Contract: Particularly in the Contracts of Arbitration 
and Chartering’ (2004) 35 J Mar L & Com 561, 563. 
4 Jacobellis v State of Ohio 378 US 184, 197 (1964) (Supreme Court, per J Stewart), 
while actually referring to obscene material. 
5 Georg Schwarzenberger and Edward D Brown, A Manual of International Law, (6th edn, 
Professional 1976). 118, 119, and Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals (Stevens 1953) 105, have also desisted; cf JF 
O'Connor, Good Faith in International Law (Aldershot 1991) 36.  
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legal value of the principle of good faith in municipal legal systems, the 
means of transmuting this understanding of good faith into international 
law, and the differences and difficulties of this undertaking. Secondly, 
specific aspects of good faith are examined with particular reference to the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. Thirdly, the relation 
between the principle of good faith and sovereignty is assessed. The 
argument is that good faith acts as a means of limiting state sovereignty 
that is inherent in international law. Then, the impact of good faith is 
examined in the law of treaties, before the final conclusion.  
 
1. Good faith as a principle, a rule, or something altogether different? 
In his Hague Academy Lecture in 1957, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice stated:  
“By a principle, or general principle, as opposed to a rule, even a 
general rule, of law is meant chiefly something which is not itself a 
rule, but which underlies a rule, and explains or provides a reason for 
it. A rule answers the question ‘what’: a principle in effect answers the 
question ‘why’.”6 
Ronald Dworkin distinguishes rules from principles by the fact that rules 
always apply in an unconditional, all-or-nothing way, whereas a principle 
will only act as a guide in a decision-making process.7 This distinction will 
provide a useful aid in determining the scope of good faith in its specific 
forms: while good faith can have an important role in the determination of 
obligations, it will generally not be the source of such obligations. This 
article argues that good faith serves a mediatory role between a rule and a 
principle. 
 
2. Good faith in municipal legal systems; recognition by "civilised 
nations"  
Even though the interests of States and individuals are very different with 
regard to the application of good faith, the jurisprudence of international 
law has borrowed the methodology of the municipal legal systems: the 
indefinability of the term ‘good faith’ has led to certain concretisations8 of 
                                                
6 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit 
International 7. 
7 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Harvard UP 1977) 25 f. 
8 The term is borrowed from Robert Kolb, ‘Principles as Sources of International Law’ 
(2006) 53 NILR 19 ff; a similar approach: Saul Litvinoff, ‘Good Faith’ (1997) 71 Tul L 
Rev 1997 1645, 1659 f, who calls the normative structures the ‘critical areas’. 
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the abstract notion of the principle. This is necessary, as good faith has 
limited practical application unless a court is in a position to examine and 
assess the conduct of the State concerned, and apply the principle 
accordingly.9 In order to identify common traits in three municipal legal 
systems, basic structures of this process can be identified in German, 
French, and English law. 
In Germany good faith is most prominently codified in § 242 of the Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, hereafter ‘BGB’), which states: “[t]he 
debtor has a duty to perform according to the requirements of good faith, 
taking customary practice into consideration.” As a ‘general clause’ 
(Generalklausel), the judiciary and legal scholars have crafted and refined 
distinct legal precepts that can be applied to individual cases.10 Since a 
general clause is an open-ended legal provision, § 242 BGB requires 
balancing diverging interests in an individual case, in order to find the legal 
value of the provision and to make it applicable to a factual scenario. The 
direct application of good faith has therefore been limited to casuistry, i.e. 
an application of corrective justice tailored to the individual case.11 Some 
particular aspects that have developed are the prohibition of an abuse of 
rights (Rechtsmissbrauch),12 equitable estoppel (based on the principle of 
venire contra factum proprium),13 and acquiescence due to lapse of time 
(Verwirkung).14 The judiciary has had a prominent role in shaping the 
foundations of good faith: from a public law standpoint, the Lüth decision 
of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht)15 paved 
the way for aspects of fundamental rights to be read into the general 
                                                
9 Cf Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) (Merits) [1957] ICJ Rep 9, 
para 54 (Sep Op Lauterpacht); Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht: The Scholar as 
Judge: Part 1’(1961) 37 British Ybk Intl L 35. 
10 Dirk Looschelders and Dirk Olzen ‘§ 242 BGB’ in Julius von Staudinger, Kommentar 
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Buch 2, (Sellier 2009)  paras 211, 82. 
11 Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 102; Claudia Schubert and Günther H Roth ‘§ 
242 BGB’ in Franz Jürgen Säcker, Roland Rixecker and Hartmut Oetker (eds), 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (6th edn, CH Beck 2012 ) para 14 
f.  
12 BGHZ 30, 140, 140; Schubert and Roth (n 11) para 235; Looschelders and Olzen (n 
10) para 214. 
13 BGHZ 50, 191, 196; Schubert and Roth (n 11) para 319; Looschelders and Olzen (n 
10) para 286. 
14 BGHZ 105, 290, 298; Schubert and Roth (n 11) para 329; Looschelders and Olzen (n 
10) para 302. 
15 BVerfGE 7, 198. 
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clauses of law.16 It thus made § 242 BGB receptive to an objective value-
based paradigm, 17  which demonstrates the judicial activism in the 
application of good faith.  
In France, good faith (bonne foi) is codified in Art. 1134(3) of the Civil 
Code (Code civil), which states that: "[Les conventions] doivent être 
exécutées de bonne foi".18 Even though bonne foi does not have the same 
elevated standing as in the BGB in Germany, the concept has recently 
acquired increasing importance. 19  Indeed, French jurisprudence has 
developed alternative means of achieving similar results by resorting to 
other, related concepts, such as waiver and abus de droit20 - concepts that 
fall under § 242 in Germany. The reason why the ‘general clause’ idea has 
not been embraced can be explained by the fact that French law, similarly 
to English law, placed the creation of new cases of good faith into the 
hands of the legislature, rather than the judiciary.21 
Turning now to English law, although Lord Mansfield stated in 1766 
that good faith is "the governing principle... applicable to all contracts and 
dealings,"22 there is no general obligation to act in good faith. No single 
statutory provision or rule of English law clearly formulates the principle 
of good faith. Rather, the common law has developed what has been 
described as ‘piecemeal solutions’.23 Instead of one overarching provision, 
                                                
16 Achim Seifert, ‘Die Horizontale Wirkung von Grundrechten. Europarechtliche und 
rechtsvergleichende Überlegungen (2011) 14 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht  
696 f. 
17 Hans D Jarass, ‘Die Grundrechte: Abwehrrechte und objektive Grundsatznormen. 
Objektive Grundrechtsgehalte‘  in Peter Badura and Horst Dreier (eds) Festschrift 50 
Jahre BVerfG (Vol 2 Mohr Siebeck, 2001) 35 ff; Thomas Ritter, ‘Neue Werteordnung 
für die Gesetzesauslegung durch den Lissabon-Vertrag (2010) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1110, 1114. 
18 “[Agreements] must be performed in good faith” (own translation). Cf generally: 
François Terré, Philippe Simler and Yves Lequette, Droit Civil: Les obligations, (9th edn, 
Dalloz 2005) para 439 f. 
19 Terré, Simler and Lequette (n 18) para 43 ff; Peter Jung, ‘Die Generalklausel im 
deutschen und französischen Vertragsrecht‘ in Christian Baldus and Peter-Christian 
Müller-Graff (eds), Die Generalklausel im Vertragsrecht: Zur Leistungsfähigkeit der 
deutschen Wissenschaft aus romanischer Perspektive, (Sellier 2006) 37,  53; Reinhard 
Zimmermann/ Simon Whittaker, ‘Good Faith in European contract law: surveying the 
legal landscape‘ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds), Good Faith in 
European Contract Law, (CUP 2000) 39. 
20 Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 1127 f. 
21M Filippo Ranieri, ‘Bonne foi et exercise de droit‘ (1998) 50 RIDC 1058. 
22 Carter v Boehm [1766] 97 ER (KB) 1162, cited by Tetley (n 3) 567; cf Patrick S 
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (Clarendon Press, 1979) 168. 
23 Interfoto Pictures Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes [1989] QB 326, 439. 
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there are several legal mechanisms that can deal with instances of 
perceived unfairness; these include misrepresentation and mistake, undue 
influence, estoppel24 and so on, as well as developments in equity.25 
Lord Denning attempted (albeit obiter), in Lloyds Bank v Bundy, the 
introduction of a general doctrine of unequal bargaining power.26 However, 
this approach was rejected by the House of Lords in National Westminster 
v Morgan, where it was held that Denning's approach was neither justified, 
nor necessary, nor even desirable.27 The reasons for the reluctance of 
English courts to develop and apply a standard of good faith in contract law 
have been described as being threefold: firstly, the English courts adhere to 
the strongly individualistic nature of bargaining for one's own end, which 
necessitates the shunning of elements of social justice.28 Secondly, the 
courts have been reluctant to introduce a general principle of fairness. The 
competence to make such an encroachment into the law of contract is 
believed to lie with Parliament.29 The favoured piecemeal approach can be 
applied case-by-case, in order to select instances of manifest injuriousness 
and apply corrective means on an individual basis.30 Lastly, the elements of 
predictability and stability of the common law are seen as factors for the 
rejection of a general clause of good faith: as such a clause would be 
difficult to define, it would risk being too ambiguous to be enforced.31 
                                                
24 Stephen Smith, Contract Theory, (OUP 2004) 366 f (misrepresentation and mistake), 
348 (undue influence), 234 (estoppel); Guenter Treitel, The Law of Contract, (Edwin Peel 
ed, 12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 310 f (mistake), 361 (misrepresentation), 446 
(undue influence), 146 (estoppel).  
25 For aspects of equity in international law, see Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960- 1989: Part One (1989) 59 British 
Ybk Intl L 49 f; very instructive: Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Role of Equity in International 
Law’ (1988) 12 Aust Ybk Intl L 54. 
26 Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] QB 326, 339-340 (CA) (per L Denning MR). 
27 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686, 692, 707 (HL). 
28 Maud Piers, ‘Good Faith in English Law – Could a Rule become a Principle?’ (2011) 
26 Tul Eur & Civ L F 123, 130. 
29 Harbutts 'Plasticine' Ltd v Wayne Tank Pump Co Ltd [1970] 1 QB 447 (CA); Photo 
Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL); Reinhard Zimmermann 
and Simon Whittaker, ‘Coming to terms with good faith" in Zimmermann and 
Whittaker (n 19) 688, 690. Parliament did intervene with the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977.  
30 Luigi Russi, ‘Substance or mere Technique: A précis on Good Faith performance in 
England, France and Germany’ (2009) 5 Hanse L  Rev 21, 28. 
31 Cf Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138 (HL); Ewan McEndrick, ‘The Meaning of 
Good Faith’ in Mads Andenas, Silvia Diaz Alabart, Basil Markesinis, Hans Micklitz 
and Nello Pasquini (eds), Private Law Beyond National Systems Liber Amicorum Guido 
Alpha (BICL, 2007) 687, 691; Hugh Collins, Law of Contract, (4th edn, CUP 2003) 181; 
Looschelders and Olzen (n 10) para 1149, 1150. 
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3. Importing municipal law into the Law of Nations "lock, stock and 
barrel"? 
When international courts and tribunals look to general principles of law, 
the private law institutions are not imported into international law ‘lock, 
stock, and barrel’.32 Rather, in the words of Judge McNair, "the duty of 
international tribunals is to regard any features or terminology which are 
reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of 
policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and 
institutions."33 Accordingly, two levels have to be distinguished at which 
good faith has a legal value. Even though the principle of good faith has a 
well-defined municipal law counterpart, the international legal system has 
not imported these in its totality. Rather, a nuanced approach has been 
favoured. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been reticent to turn directly 
to municipal law, in order to determine aspects of good faith.34 Yet, the 
general principles of municipal law require some mechanism in order to be 
‘elevated’ into international law.35 Since an undifferentiated transmutation 
of municipal into international law is not applied, a different method has to 
be discerned. The method favoured by the Court seems to be a careful 
process of analogy. The municipal legal systems are examined in order to 
find a general legal rule that can be defined and stated in a 'pure form', 
which is achieved by making it widely applicable to the special interests 
that States have in their legal relations. By replacing the parties with 
algebraic forms, i.e. x and y, which are then replaced with State A and State 
B, the distilled rule is found and applied; if the general principle can still be 
applied in congruity with the aspects that are specific to international law, 
                                                
32 For a different phrasing of the question, cf RD Kierney, ‘Sources of Law and the ICJ’ 
in Leo Gross (ed), The Future of the International Court of Justice Vol. 2, (Oceana 
1976) 701: "But wherein lies the magic of this philosophers stone that transmutes 
municipal into international law?”. 
33 International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 148 
(Sep. Op. McNair); cf Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of 
International Law, (Longmans 1927) 83. 
34 Hermann Mosler, ‘To What Extent Does the Variety of Legal Systems of the World 
influence the Application of General Principles of Law?’ in TMC Asser Institute (eds) 
International Law and the Grotian Heritage (TMC Asser Instituut 1985) 180. 
35 Cf Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the ICJ: Part Two’ (1990) 62 British 
Ybk Intl L 114 f. 
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then the general principle is applied in the given case.36 
 
4. Differences between national and international conceptions of good 
faith  
As municipal legal systems display different means of applying good faith, 
no single method can be identified.37 International law differs markedly 
from municipal law through its lack of comparable norm-creating and 
enforcement institutions. The system of international law is based on a 
voluntarist and co-operative character, best exemplified by the acceptance, 
for the most part, of customary international law; i.e. the law created and 
observed by the States themselves.38 
There is, by and large, no central legislative body in international law.39 
Without a central body to legislate in this area, an all-pervading obligation 
of good faith in international law is difficult to establish.40 The ICJ's case 
law is defined enough to act as a central source of guidance in applying the 
principle of good faith, but it is not competent to act as a law-generating 
institution.41 Indeed, it is questionable whether the international judiciary, 
made up of courts and tribunals, is best placed to serve an active role in the 
creation of good faith casuistry. The differing attitudes to the desirability of 
judicial activism in municipal legal systems would be greatly amplified in 
international law.  
In municipal law, good faith acts to balance out unequal sides of a 
bargain.42 In international law this asymmetrical power balance, whether 
real or perceived, is absent. The principle of sovereign equality of nations 
dictates that there is no 'weak party' to a bargain in international law: by 
                                                
36 South-West Africa Cases (Liberia v South Africa) (Second Phase: Judgments) [1966] 
ICJ Rep 250, paras 296-297 (Diss Op Tanaka); Thirlway (n 35) 118. The methodology 
of the court is slightly controversial and cannot be fully examined here; for example 
Akehurst makes the point that it would be more efficacious only to apply the general 
principles that apply between the parties, rather than those of all civilised nations; 
Michael Akehurst, ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 801, 824. 
37Cf O' Connor (n 5) 41. 
38 Cf Crawford (n 1) 16. 
39 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law Vol 1, (9th edn, 
Longman 1992) 114; however, a trend is emerging whereby the UN Security Council is 
seen to be acting legislatively, cf Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World 
Legislature’ (2005) 99 AJIL 175. 
40 See generally Yuval Shany, ‘Towards a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in 
International Law?’(2005) 16 EJIL 907, 920 f. 
41 Cf Thirlway (n 25) 58 (on the ICJ's reluctance to be seen as "legislating").  
42 Looschelders and  Olzen (n 10) para 147; Klaus Adomeit, ‘Die gestörte 
Vertragsparität- Ein Trugbild‘ (1994) 38 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2467, 2468. 
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"entering the Family of Nations a State comes as an equal to equals".43 This 
does not necessarily mean that States are completely equal as regards 
power, territory, and the like. But as States, they are legally equal, at least 
in principle, whatever differences between them may otherwise exist.44 As 
a result, even though sovereign equality can still serve to protect weaker 
States from the hegemony of stronger States,45 the fundamental conception 
of good faith as a means of corrective justice is not directly applicable to 
the relations between States. 
 
B. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Like municipal law, good faith in international law has been subject to 
concretisations. In order for the international legal order to be predictable 
and consistent, scholars have examined and clarified the doctrinal aspects 
of these concretisations, while judicial bodies have applied them to factual 
scenarios. Though far from conclusive, four main concretisations are 
examined here, namely the maxim pacta sunt servanda, abuse of rights and 
discretion, estoppel and acquiescence, and negotiations in good faith. These 
have been subject to important judicial decisions and are recognised as 
sources of international law. 
 
1. Pacta sunt servanda 
The maxim ‘pacta sunt servanda’ has been said to relate solely to the law 
of treaties.46 However, based on good faith, the ICJ has found that that a 
State can be bound by a unilateral act alone: a public statement made by a 
State, with an intention to be bound, can create legal obligations, which 
could otherwise only be created through a treaty. 
The rationale behind the maxim is seemingly self-evident: a need by the 
international community for a system that can ensure international order 
                                                
43Hersch Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law, (8th edn, Longmans 1955) 263; 
Crawford (n 1) 449. 
44 Jennings and Watts (n 39) 339; this is described as the ‘orthodoxy’ by Gerry Simpson, 
Great Powers and Outlaw States, (CUP 2004) 26 f.  
45 Juliane Kokott, ‘States, Sovereign Equality’ in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law (MPEPIL) (April 2011, online edn), para 43 ff, available at 
www.mpepil.com. 
46 Anthony Aust, ‘Pacta sunt Servanda’ in MPEPIL (February 2007, online edn) para 2, 
available at www.mpepil.com; Richard Hyland, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation’ 
(1993) 34 Va J Intl L 405, 406. The maxim translates as “binding agreements must be 
kept”. 
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and prevent arbitrary behaviour and chaos.47 In the Nuclear Tests Case, the 
ICJ held that: 
"One of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations... is good faith. Trust and 
confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in 
particular in an age when this cooperation in many fields is 
becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta 
sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so 
also is the binding character of an international obligation. 
Thus interested States may take cognisance of unilateral 
declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to 
require that the obligation thus created be respected."48 
 
The French Government declared that no more nuclear tests would be 
conducted in the Pacific. In this case the Court gave these statements by a 
State (the declaring State) the same legal effects that can usually only be 
attributed to a binding synallagmatic treaty towards the receiving State. The 
Court found that if some prerequisites were met, then a unilateral 
declaration can bind a State; these are: the context of the statement, the 
intention of the declaring State, no necessary acceptance by the receiving 
State or observance of formal requirements.49 For present purposes, the 
context and intent are most important.  
The statement's context is important: it must be made publicly; a 
receiving State must be able to take cognisance of the declaration. The 
most important aspect of the binding nature is the (subjective) intention of 
the declaring State, as this distinguishes the statement from other, non-
binding statements. However, the (objective) trust and confidence that is 
placed in the statement by the receiving State is paramount to the creation 
of an obligation; here good faith acts as the norm regulating the legal effect 
of the act.50 The Court’s reasoning shows that good faith can be a basis for 
                                                
47 Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk, ‘The Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of 
Obligation under International Law’ (83) AJIL 1989 513. 
48 Nuclear Tests Case (n 2) para 46 (emphasis added).  
49 The element of a form requirement is negligible, as international law imposes no 
strict requirements, therefore the statement may be made orally or in writing; cf Nuclear 
Tests Case (n 2) para 45. The fact that no formal acceptance is necessary seems to 
demarcate the unilateral statement from a formal agreement, Nuclear Tests Case (n 2) 
paras 43-50; cf Thirlway (n 25) 10-17; Camille Goodman, ‘Acta Sunt Servanda? A 
Regime for Regulating the Unilateral Acts of States at International Law’ (2006) 25 
Aust Ybk Intl L 43, 53-59.  
50 Goodman (n 49) 57; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, (CUP 1989) 308. 
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legal obligations in the same way as the maxim pacta sunt servanda is for 
treaty obligations.51 However, some elements and the terminology of the 
case are contentious and there is no general rule to determine which 
unilateral acts give rise to legal rights and duties.52 
 
2. Abuse of rights and abuse of discretion 
Possibly the most contentious aspect of good faith in international law is 
the prohibition on the abuse of rights. The aspect of abuse of right and the 
arbitrary exercise of a right are closely related and not clearly 
distinguishable. An abuse of right is said to occur when a State exercises its 
rights in such a way as to encroach on the rights of another State, and that 
the exercise “... is unreasonable, and pursued in an arbitrary manner, 
without due consideration of the legitimate expectations of the other 
State.”53 The basis that prohibits this behaviour is good faith. If a State is 
able to exercise discretion, the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of this 
discretion is said to amount to an abuse of rights,54 which a State can be 
held internationally responsible for.55 Abuse of rights may take place in 
three distinct sets of circumstances:56  
(a) a State exercises its right in such a way as to hinder another 
State enjoying its own rights;  
(b) a State exercises a right for an end which it was not 
intended for (improper purposes);  
(c) arbitrary exercise of a right causing injury to another party.  
As a result, the concept of abuse of right is often discussed in 
conjunction with the element of discretion that a State has in the exercise of 
                                                
51 Cf Vaughan Lowe, International Law, (OUP 2007) 74.  
52 Jennings and Watts (n 39) 1190; The ILC has undertaken the task of examining the 
unilateral acts of state as a topic of appropriate for codification (cf ILC, ‘Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission Vol II Part 2 (1996) A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/add.1 (Part 2) 
141); Thirlway is critical of the Court's use of terminology here (cf Thirlway (n 25) 10). 
In his opinion the ICJ wanted to enunciate the principle to the effect that the giving of 
consent (consent to be bound) creates legal obligations. It is submitted, however, that, 
even if this were the case, the Court made itself clear in assigning trust and confidence a 
pronounced role in its judgment. 
53 Cf Lauterpacht (n 43) 345.  
54 Tariq Hassan, ‘Good Faith in Treaty Formation’ (1980) 21 Va J Intl L 448; Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice’ (1953) 30 
British Ybk Intl L 1, 53. 
55 Cf Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States of America v Canada) (1938/ 1941) III 
RIAA 1904, 1965; Cheng (n 5) 130. 
56 Alexandre Kiss, ‘Abuse of Rights’ in MPEPIL (December 2006, online edn) para 4 f, 
available at www.mpepil.com.  
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its rights.57 Subsets (b) and (c) above borrow aspects from municipal 
administrative law,58 and there is some academic dispute as to whether they 
can be transmuted into international law.59 It is especially contentious 
whether international law has a comparable level of subordination 60 
between States. This would be a necessary prerequisite for the application 
of the ICJ’s careful analogy of municipal administrative principles.61 For 
the careful analogous application of aspects of municipal law, based on the 
methodology of the ICJ, a level of subordination would need to be evident, 
i.e. a State would have to be in a position to be able to exercise rights over 
another State without prior consent.  
The discretion left to States in the exercise of their rights is very 
wide.62 In order to meet the threshold of an abuse of that right an element 
of bad faith is necessary. This is difficult to prove in front of a judicial 
body,63 as bad faith is never to be presumed but, rather, always has to be 
proven.64 As a whole, the Courts have not been forthcoming in holding 
States responsible for acts of abuse of right. However, two cases 
demonstrate how elements of abuse of rights can have an impact on the 
relations between States at the level of international law.  
 
i. Admission of a State to the UN 
In its Advisory Opinion on whether States were allowed to vote on the 
                                                
57 Michael Byers, ‘Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age’ (2002) 47 McGill L 
J 389, 423; GDS Taylor, ‘Content and Rule against Abuse of Rights in International 
Law’ (1972) 46 British Ybk Intl L 323, 324 ff. 
58 For example: "détournement de pouvoir in France (see BO Iluyomade, ‘Abuse of 
Right in International Law’ (1975) 16 Harv Intl L J 47, 51), Willkürverbot in Germany 
(for the term cf Gerhard Leibholz, ‘Ermessensmißbrauch im Völkerrecht’ (1929) 1 
ZäoRV 78 ff); see also Taylor (n 57) 336 f, 342 f for English administrative law.  
59 Cf part 0. 
60 Cf Rupert Klaus Neuhaus, Rechtsmißbrauchsverbot im heutigen Völkerrecht, (Duncker 
& Humblot 1984) 86. Subordination is here meant to denote a vertical power balance of 
one State over another, as opposed to the horizontal balance dogmatically rooted in the 
sovereign equality of States.   
61 Cf Neuhaus (n 60) 88-90; Leibholz (n 58) 80-82. 
62 Cheng (n 5) 132; for a discussion of whether a general margin of appreciation is 
developing, see Shany (n 40) 931 f, who interprets the ICJ’s jurisprudence as rejecting a 
margin of appreciation. 
63 Nevertheless, the abuse of rights has been advanced as a basis of claim in the 
Barcelona Traction Case, see Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment: Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 
17; cf Iluyomade (n 58) 70 f.   
64 Case concerning certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v 
Poland) (Merits) [1926] PCIJ Rep 30; Virally (n 2) 132. 
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admission of a new Member State to the UN, the Court was faced with Art. 
4 (1) UN Charter. This provision laid out the prerequisites which a State 
must meet in order to be admitted to the UN. The question was whether the 
list of five conditions set out in Art. 4 (1) UN Charter were conclusive, or 
whether other (political) considerations could be taken into account. The 
conditions are that the candidate must be a State, which is peace-loving, 
accepts the obligations of the Charter, and is both able and willing to carry 
out these obligations.65  
The Court concluded that no other conditions could be taken into 
account.66 The interesting aspect to note here is that the Court stated that, 
while discretion could be used by the voting State, it was curtailed by the 
limits set by Art. 4 (1) UN Charter.67 The dissenting judges agreed to the 
extent that the discretion was curtailed, but by the object and purpose of the 
UN Charter generally. For the evaluation of the relevance of good faith in 
determinations of this kind, it has to be noted that the judges all agreed that 
the discretion inherent in the right to vote must be guided by considerations 
of justice68 and must be "exercised in good faith",69 a duty that is also 
codified in Art. 2 (2) of the Charter. 
 
ii. Environmental cases 
Abuse of rights can also become particularly relevant when environmental 
resources are shared.70 Two cases highlight how an abuse of rights can 
arise between neighbouring States. The Trail Smelter Arbitration dealt with 
the fumes and air pollution produced by a Canadian smelter situated on the 
border of the US state of Washington.71 In the Pulp Mills Case, the ICJ had 
to decide a case brought by Argentina against Uruguay. Here a pulp mill 
had been built on the banks of the shared Uruguay River, which created 
                                                
65 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 62. 
66 Ibid para 65. 
67 See also Taylor (n 57) 343. 
68 Conditions of Admission (n 65) para 71 (Diss Op Judge Alvarez). 
69 Ibid para 63.  
70 Cf Kiss (n 56) para 4; this is based on the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas or 
"use your property so as not to harm another"; Lauterpacht (n 43) 346. 
71 Trail Smelter Arbitration (n 55) 1905-1982; see Russell A Miller, ‘Trail Smelter 
Arbitration’ in MPEPIL (May 2007, online edn) para 2 f, available at www.mpepil.com; 
cf Lowe (n 51) 240. 
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pollution and affected Argentina's use of the river.72 In both cases a State 
had built, or was planning to build, an industrial plant (the utilising State) 
that was going to cause some measure of environmental damage to 
neighbouring territory. Both developments were subject to international 
treaties outlining the obligations that the States had in relation to the 
undertaking. 
The territorial sovereignty of a State allows for the exploitation of 
natural resources. However, this right is limited when the rights of another 
State are at stake. The cases have both focussed on the balancing act to be 
conducted by the utilising State. Cheng calls this the “interdependence” of 
rights: "every right is subject to such limitations as are necessary to render 
it compatible both with a party's contractual obligations and with his 
obligations under the general law".73 If the utilising State uses its resources 
in a way that is suited to deprive the neighbouring State of its own right, an 
abuse of right by the utilising State may occur. However, an abuse of rights 
would require some element of positive bad faith, e.g. when the damage 
caused by the utilising State is greater than its own gain.74 It is submitted, 
therefore, that there is a duty based on good faith, but under the threshold 
of abuse of rights, to the extent that a State may only use an absolute right 
in a way that does not cause damage to another. Both judgments also dealt 
extensively with the duty to negotiate the effects of the industrial 
production, an aspect of good faith that will be examined below.75 
 
iii. Criticisms by Schwarzenberger/ Brown and Lowe 
The broadness of the definition and the difficulty in applying abuse of right 
has brought it substantial criticism as a general principle. 76 
Schwarzenberger and Brown have stated that it is difficult to establish what 
constitutes an abuse of rights as opposed to a harsh, yet justified use of a 
right.77 The determination is necessarily one that is subjective, along with 
being case-dependent, so that there is no place for the concept as a general 
                                                
72 Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) 
[2010] ICJ Rep 18, para 14; Paula Maria Vernet, ‘Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay’ in 
MPEPIL (July 2010, online edn) para 7 f, available at www.mpepil.com.  
73 Cheng (n 5) 130. 
74 Kiss (n 56) para 4. 
75 See also: Cameron Hutchison, ‘Coming in from the Shadow of the Law: The Use of 
Law by States to Negotiate International Environmental Disputes in Good Faith (2005) 
43 Can Ybk Intl L 101, 105 ff. 
76 Neuhaus (n 60) 180. 
77 Schwarzenberger and Brown (n 5) 84. 
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principle of law.78 However, they go on to state that good faith has its place 
in treaty relations between States.79 On the other hand, Lowe states that 
concepts like abuse of rights are interstitial rights; as such they do not have 
an independent normative function, but are to be seen as concomitant with 
the obligations that they underpin.80 Even if abuse of right is not in itself a 
general principle, it can act as a yardstick for the extent of rights and 
obligations, especially in relation to other States that may be affected as a 
result. Finally, the modern jurisprudence of the ICJ suggests that the Court 
will be slow to assume an abuse of rights, unless the evidence is explicitly 
clear, and that it will favour the interpretation of the parties’ acts or 
agreements, in order to determine the scope of the right or obligation, 
before reaching such a conclusion.81 
Abuse of rights still remains relatively loosely defined and needs to be 
"pruned of its exuberances",82 if it is to become a specific rule of customary 
international law. A lack of consistent State practice means it is not likely a 
rule of customary international law. However, it can be helpful in 
determining the use and scope of rights in situations of interdependence. 
The doctrinal groundwork, particularly in relation to the uses of abuse of 
rights in municipal law, can work to shed some light on how to approach 
this conflict between States in international law.  
 
3. Estoppel and acquiescence 
Further aspects of good faith in international law, which have fairly well 
established private law counterparts, are the principles of estoppel and 
acquiescence. A considerable weight of authority supports the view that 
estoppel is a general principle of international law, resting on principles of 
good faith and consistency.83 Even though private law, particularly the 
                                                
78 So too, Neuhaus (n 60) 183. 
79  Schwarzenberger and Brown (n 5) 118. 
80 Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of 
Norm Creation Changing’ in Michael Byers (ed) The Role of Law in International 
Politics: Essays in international Relations and international Law (OUP 2000) 207, 212-
221. 
81 Case concerning Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 para 127; Case 
concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Merits) [1982] 
ICJ Rep 13 para 42; Thirlway (n 25) 28. 
82 Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order, (Stevens 1971) 88. 
83 Crawford (n 1) 421; IC MacGibbon, ‘Estoppel in International Law’ (1958) 7 ICLQ 
468, 471; ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol 2 (1953) 
A/CN.4/63 (per SR Lauterpacht) 144. 
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common law, has developed a very multi-faceted approach with variations 
of estoppel (promissory, equitable, by silence etc.), international law also 
has its own (albeit more basic) conception. Under the principle of estoppel, 
a party is not permitted to take up a legal position that is in contradiction 
with its own previous representations or conduct, when another party has 
been led to assume obligations towards, or attribute rights to the former 
party in reliance upon such representations or conduct.84 
Even though municipal law, particularly contract law, has many 
different formulations of this behaviour (such as the notion of venire contra 
factum proprium 85 ), in international law the remit is broader. 86  The 
legitimate reliance of one State (State A) on the conduct of another (State 
B) precludes this State from acting contrary to its representations. If State 
B then acts contrary to this representation, it is acting without good faith 
and therefore in contravention of international law. The principle helps to 
safeguard a State's legitimate reliance on the actions of other States, in the 
sense that faith and confidence are protected when they are placed 
reasonably on the actions of another. This constitutes one of the most 
important aspects of good faith.87 
A related, yet distinguishable, aspect is acquiescence, which can be 
described as the inaction of a State, which is faced with a situation 
constituting a threat to, or infringement of, its rights.88 The two defining 
differences between estoppel and acquiescence are the components of time 
and reliance: estoppel hinges on previous presentations; while acquiescence 
is that passivity in relation to a right of another State to the extent that good 
                                                
84 ILC, Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol 2 (1963). 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1 (per SR Waldock) 40; cf for the aspect of reliance: 
Thomas M Franck, ‘Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System’ (1993) 
240 Receuil des Cour 66; MacGibbon (n 83) 468; Litvinoff (n 8) 1664. It is in this 
regard very similar in nature to the Roman law principle of "non licet venire contra 
factum proprium" and "allegans contraria non audiendus est"(cf Thomas Cottier and 
Jörg Paul Müller, ‘Estoppel’ in MPEPIL (April 2007, online edn) para 9, available at 
www.mpepil.com.   
85 Cf 0. 
86 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Merits) [1962] 
ICJ Rep 39 f, (Sep Op Alfaro). 
87 Cheng (n 5) 144; DW Bowett, ‘Estoppel before International Tribunals and its Relation 
to Acquiescence’ (1957) 33 British Ybk Intl L 176, 193 f. 
88 IC MacGibbon, ‘The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law’ (1954) 31 British 
Ybk Intl L 143; in German this would be called "beredtes (oder qualifiziertes) 
Schweigen" cf BGH NJW 1951, 711; Jan Busche ‘§ 147 BGB’ in Franz Jürgen Säcker, 
Roland Rixecker and Hartmut Oetker (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch, (5th edn, CH Beck 2010 ) para 7. 
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faith affords the passivity the character of consent.89 In the Gulf of Maine 
Case the ICJ acknowledged the legal effect of a "qualified silence" when it 
stated that it is "equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral 
conduct which the other party may interpret as consent".90 
One of the inherent difficulties of acquiescence is the establishment 
of the true intent of the silent state, which is inevitably a legal fiction.91 
Showing that a State meant to say something (subjective aspect), while 
remaining silent (objective aspect) has considerable procedural difficulties. 
The fiction that a State has indeed acquiesced to an infringement of its 
rights can only be justified if due regard is had to the reasonable trust that 
the other State had in the subjective value of the silence.92 
The concepts of estoppel and acquiescence have featured strongly in 
border and land title disputes. 93  In this context, the ground-breaking 
decision was the Temple of Preah Vihear Case. The Temple is an 
archaeologically and artistically important sanctuary, situated on the 
Dangrek Mountains between Cambodia and Thailand. In 1904 a Treaty had 
been signed by France (on behalf of its protectorate, present day 
Cambodia) with Siam (now Thailand). This called for the delimitation of 
the area to be performed by a mixed Commission, which produced its maps 
in 1907 and posited the Temple in Cambodian territory. However, Thailand 
took the view that it possessed the area surrounding the Temple and took 
control of the site. Cambodia's diplomatic efforts to regain the territory 
failed and the case was referred to the ICJ. 
The Court relied on acquiescence and estoppel,94 rather than looking 
to the cultural, historic, or religious factors, the ICJ deemed that Thailand 
should have objected to the maps in a timely manner. Thailand entered no 
                                                
89 Jörg Paul Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht, (Carl Heymanns 1971) 38 f; cf 
MacGibbon (n 88) 143 f; Nuno Sergio Marques Antunes, ‘Acquiescence‘ in MPEPIL 
(September 2006, online edn) para 19, available at www.mpepil.com;  cf Franck (n 84) 
68. 
90 Case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine 
Area (Canada v United States of America) (Merits) [1984] ICJ Rep 305. 
91 Sophie Kopela, ‘The Legal Value of Silence as State Conduct in the Jurisprudence of 
International Tribunals’ (2010) 29 Aust Ybk Intl L 101. 
92 A related aspect to acquiescence is that of extinctive prescription; here, a party can lose 
its rights by not pursuing them in a timely manner. However, a finding of good faith is not 
strictly necessary and it functions mainly as a procedural right; cf: Müller (n 89) 75; 
Jennings and Watts (n 39) 705 f; BE King, ‘Prescription in Claims in International Law’ 
(1934) 15 British Ybk Intl L 82, 94; Jan Wouters and Sten Verhoeven, ‘Prescription’ in 
MPEPIL (November 2008, online edn) para 8, available at www.mpepil.com.  
93 Müller (n 89) 39 f. 
94 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (n 86) 27 f. 
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reservations to the original Treaty disputing the accuracy of the 
Commission's maps.  Further Friendship Treaty negotiations (in 1925 and 
1937) and a Franco-Siamese reconciliation Committee (set up in 1947) also 
ended with agreements being signed, yet with no reservations entered in 
respect of the original maps. Coupled with the objective of creating 
stability and finality95 through the demarcation of borders, a legitimate 
reliance by Cambodia was implied.96 Thailand was therefore estopped from 
raising any objections to the original 1907 maps at the present time, having 
not made declarations to that effect before. The primary foundation of the 
principle of estoppel is, as Judge Alfaro noted, "the good faith that must 
prevail in international relations, inasmuch as consistency of conduct or 
opinion on the part of the State to the prejudice of another is incompatible 
with good faith."97 
Acquiescence and estoppel ascribe substantial legal consequences to the 
inactivity of a State; as such, these institutions should be restrictively 
interpreted and applied. They find their justification in the reasonable 
reliance of one State (based on good faith) on the representation or conduct 
of another.98 A State has the ability to make declarations to preserve its 
rights and preclude the effects of tacit consent,99 placing the onus of action 
on the State that has allowed the reliance and trust. 
 
4. Negotiations in good faith 
When States negotiate it is not enough for representatives to meet and 
discuss. Good faith negotiations require the parties to demonstrate 
‘reasonable regard’ for the other's rights and interests. Further, the parties 
must, with a view to end the dispute amicably, aim for a clear result; in 
short: the negotiations must be meaningful.100 Unjustifiably breaking off 
the negotiations, creating abnormal delays, disregarding the agreed 
procedures, or systematic refusal to take into consideration adverse 
proposals or interests can amount to breaches of good faith.101 Even when 
                                                
95 Cf MacGibbon  (n 83) 468 f. 
96 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (n 86) 34; see for the aspect of reliance 
of the conduct, Nuclear Tests Case (n 2) para 46. 
97 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (n 86) 42 (Sep Op Alfaro). 
98 Marques Antunes (n 89) para 24;  MacGibbon (n 83) 507. 
99 See generally on the standards for these actions or ‘pleas’, MacGibbon (n 88) 172 ff. 
100 O'Connor (n 5) 95, 96; Shaw (n 1) 1017. 
101 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (Award) [1957] XII RIAA 281; also John 
G Laylin and Rinaldo L Binachi, ‘The Role of Adjudication in International River 
Disputes: The Lac Lanoux Case’ (1959) 53 AJIL 30. 
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there is only a small chance that the negotiations will end in success, the 
parties are bound by a duty to endeavour to end the dispute.102 However, 
there appears to be no general rule of international law requiring the 
negotiations to be exhausted before a judicial settlement may be sought.103 
So far, the ICJ has only developed the obligation to negotiate in good faith 
in relation to legal rights and has not expanded the notion to any acts 
between States that do not relate to a legal obligation.104 
In 1971 Iceland unilaterally announced that it was extending its 
exclusive fishing zone to 50 nautical miles, thereby terminating agreements 
it had with Germany and the UK. A dispute ensued before the ICJ. On the 
merits the Court stressed the need to reconcile the disputed fishing rights 
through negotiations. The Court also issued the parties with the objectives, 
which the negotiations should cover, e.g. delimiting the fishing rights, 
catch-limitations, share allocation and restrictions and required that they 
should be conducted in good faith. 105  This judgment builds on the 
obligation for the negotiations to be ‘meaningful’, as the Court had noted in 
an earlier case.106 
 
C. THE INTERRELATION OF GOOD FAITH WITH SOVEREIGNTY 
Historically the principle of internal sovereignty has been understood as the 
supreme authority, or ultimate power, of a State within its territory,107 while 
the external sovereignty is the dimension that pertains to the international 
rights and duties of a State in relation to other States.108 In 1927, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) developed the Lotus 
                                                
102 JG Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, (5th edn, CUP 2011) 12. 
103 John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, Settlement of Disputes in International Law, (OUP 
1999) 21. 
104  Judge Padilla Nervo called it an obligation tracto continuo: never ends and is 
potentially present in all relations and dealings between States, North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark/ Netherlands) (Merits) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 92 (Sep 
Op Padilla Nervo). 
105 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 3, 
73 f. 
106 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (n 104) para 87. 
107 Customs Regime between Germany and Austria (Advisory Opinion) [1931] PCIJ Rep 
Series A/B 57 (Ind Op Anzilotti); Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in MPEPIL (April 
2011, online edn) para 1, available at www.mpepil.com; Lowe (n 51) 172. 
108 The Island of Palmas case (United States of America v Netherlands) (Award) [1928] 
II RIAA 838 f (Op. Huber); Besson (n 107) para 70; Ronald Brand, ‘Sovereignty: The 
State, the Individual, and the International Legal System in the Twenty First Century’ 
(2001) 25 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 279, 284. 
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principle:109 based on its sovereignty, a State is free to act110 as long as this 
behaviour is not prohibited by an explicit rule of international law.111 
Whether this sovereignty is understood as limited or absolute, there is 
consensus that States must consent to rules that limit them in exercising 
their sovereignty.112 
However, applying good faith elements to a State's conduct has a 
limiting effect on its external sovereignty. The requirement of acting in 
good faith limits the actions of a State, without the requirement of an 
explicit rule in international law, as envisaged by the Lotus principle. 
Accordingly, a state might have its supreme authority or sovereignty 
limited when aspects of good faith come into play, and these aspects 
necessitate behaviour that contravenes what a state might otherwise want to 
do.113 The principle of good faith therefore acts not as a source of rights or 
obligations, but more as a means of guiding the exercise of those rights or 
obligations. Instead of answering what the obligations placed on a State 
are, or why they create legal effects for the State, the principle of good faith 
(and the specific concretisations of that principle discussed above) can 
guide a State’s behaviour as to how the inherent rights and obligations are 
exercised. This must be considered a limitation on the State’s 
sovereignty.114 
Regarding the adherence to treaty relations, the limitation of sovereignty 
is less controversial, as the binding nature of the treaty has been the subject 
to consent by the State. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has, on 
this point, gone on to state that: 
"According to the principle of international law that treaty 
obligations are to be executed in perfect good faith, therefore 
excluding the right to legislate at will concerning the subject 
matter of the treaty, and limiting the exercise of sovereignty of 
the State bound by a treaty with respect to that subject matter to 
                                                
109 The Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ Ser A No 10 4. 
110  The question in the case was of prescribing jurisdiction, as an expression of 
sovereignty.  
111 Case of the SS Lotus (n 109) 25 f; Armin v Bogdandy and Markus Rau, ‘The Lotus’ 
in MPEPIL (June 2006, online edn) paras 9-10, available at www.mpepil.com.   
112 Cf American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third, Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States (St. Paul, 1987) 17 introductory note. 
113 Jennings and Watts (n 39) 407 f; Taylor (n 57) 323 f; cf Neuhaus (n 60) 93. 
114 Lukashuk, (n 47) 513, 514, who makes the point that the assumption of obligations can 
be seen to limit sovereignty, even though undertaking is a realisation of sovereignty; in 
terms of good faith, the limits placed on the exercise can only be seen to limit a State’s 
actions, absent an express rule in international law. 
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such acts as are consistent with the treaty."115 
 
D. GOOD FAITH IN THE LAW OF TREATIES  
All signatory States of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT) note "that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the 
pacta sunt servanda rule are universally recognised".116 The VCLT is 
imbued with rules based on good faith that have effect at different stages of 
the process. 
 
1. Treaty formation and the element of good faith in Art. 18 VCLT 
After signing (but before ratifying) a treaty, a party has an obligation to 
observe the terms of the treaty. If a measure is taken after signature that 
breaches this obligation, one that is based on good faith, reciprocity can 
allow the other treaty party to repudiate the treaty or to claim compensation 
for any diminution of value. 117  The element of good faith in treaty 
formation is found in Art. 18 VCLT. This article protects the legitimate 
expectations of the other participants in the treaty-making process, and is 
therefore based on good faith.118 Whether or not the signatory State ratifies 
the treaty is a matter of discretion; however, the consent-based act of 
placing a signature on the treaty may act to reduce this discretion, so that a 
State may not exploit the signed text for its own purposes by abusing its 
inherent discretion to ratify.119 It is submitted, though, that there does not 
exist enough state practice to point to a rule that signature of a treaty leads 
to a good faith obligation to ratify, but only an obligation not to defeat the 
purpose or material normative content of the treaty in question.120 
Even though there is some disagreement as to whether Art. 18 VCLT 
                                                
115The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v United States of America) 
(Award) [1910] XI RIAA 169, para 188. 
116 Third recital. 
117Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties, (OUP 1961) 204; Schwarzenberger/ Brown (n 5) 
433 f. 
118 Oliver Dörr in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. A Commentary (Springer 2012), Art 18 para 2; Werner Morvay, ‘The 
Obligation of a State not to Frustrate the Object of a Treaty prior to its Entry into Force’ 
(1967) 27 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 451, 454. 
119 JM Jones, Full Powers and Ratification: A study of the development of treaty-making 
procedure, (CUP 1946) 89; Hassan (n 54) 462. 
120 Hassan (n 54) 461 would seemingly agree; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and 
Practice, (2nd edn, CUP 2011) 117, suggests the contrary. 
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reflects customary international law,121 international courts and tribunals 
have taken cognisance of this rule (even prior to the VCLT coming into 
force). The PCIJ laid the foundation in its judgment on Certain German 
Interests in Upper Silesia.122 The case concerned the alleged breach of 
good faith by Germany not to alienate certain property in Silesia (as part of 
the Versailles Treaty), prior to its entry into force. It was held that, even 
though the facts of the case at hand differed, Germany may not act against 
the principle of good faith. A misuse of its rights to alienate its property 
could amount to a breach of its treaty obligation.123 The Greco-Turkish 
arbitral Tribunal was even more explicit in invoking good faith as a 
foundation not to defeat the object and purpose of a nascent treaty: 
“WITH THE SIGNATURE OF A TREATY AND BEFORE ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE, 
THERE [...] EXISTS AN OBLIGATION TO DO NOTHING WHICH MAY INJURE THE 
TREATY BY REDUCING THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS OBLIGATIONS [...] THIS 
PRINCIPLE IS ONLY AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD FAITH.[ ...]"  124 
 
In modern practice, this was affirmed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Opel Austria v European Council. 125  The 
Court, after affirming that good faith forms part of EU law, formulated that 
the specifically European legal principle of ‘legitimate expectations’ is a 
corollary of this general principle.126 This further shows that good faith has 
also taken on a regional customary international law standing (at least as 
part of EU law).127 
 
2. Performing treaty obligations in good faith (Art. 26 VCLT) 
Art. 26 VCLT, in all its brevity, still makes good faith in the performance 
of a treaty obligation of paramount importance. Two elements make up this 
                                                
121 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Anne-Marie La Rosa and Makane Moïse Mbengue 
in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary (OUP 2011), Art 18 para 5; Oliver Dörr (n 118) Art 18 para 5; Morvay (n 
118) 458 albeit reluctantly states that it conforms to general international law. 
122 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (n 64) 5-83. 
123 Cf Hassan (n 54) 454; Cheng (n 5) 110; Anthony Aust differs: cf Aust (n 46) para. 8; 
Aust (n 120) 117: the act of ratification is the definitive act to create legal 
consequences, while signature itself does not.    
124 Megalidis v Turkey 8 TAM 395 (cited in Cheng (n 5) 111). 
125 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-
43. 
126 Ibid para 93; Oliver Dörr in Dörr and Schmalenbach (n 118) Art 18 para 5.  
127 Jan Wouters and Dries Van Eeckhoutte, ‘Giving Effect to Customary International 
Law through EC Law’ KU Leuven Faculty of Law Working Paper 25/2002, 27, 
available at http://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP25e.pdf.   
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obligation: the determination of the object (i.e. the treaty) to be performed 
in good faith, as well as the manner in which the obligation is performed.128 
The material duty to act in good faith during the performance of a treaty 
was stated by Waldock in the ILC's Report as "one of good faith and not 
stricti juris".129 This suggests that the object and intention of the parties is 
paramount, rather than a literal observation of the wording of the treaty.130 
A treaty should be performed with the intentions of the parties in mind, 
rather than looking to a formalistic understanding of the wording. Since the 
element of good faith is again context-dependent, the duty needs to be 
applied to the specific details of a case.131 It is submitted that elements of 
the general principles of law that relate to abuse of right, estoppel, and 
other aspects of good faith may find an analogous application to the 
performance of treaty obligations.  
 
3. Good faith in treaty interpretation 
Art. 31 VCLT states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning". Given that the obligation in Art. 26 
VCLT applies to the entire process, the interpretation of the treaty is no 
different. The exact contours of how to interpret a treaty in good faith are 
difficult, yet an element of ‘reasonableness’ must be inherent when an 
interpretation is advanced.132 Two aspects that can add contour when 
interpreting a treaty reasonably are the effectiveness of the interpretation 
(as an extension), and the imposition of new obligations (as a limitation). 
Both of these have a basis in good faith. 
As a means of interpretation, effet utile helps extend the meaning of the 
wording past its literal sense, as recourse has to be taken to "what the 
parties did mean when they used these words".133 The principle was left out 
of the VCLT, as it was feared that it would open the door to a strong 
                                                
128 Jean Salmon in Corten and Klein (n 121) Art 26 para 36. 
129  ILC, ‘Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II (1964) 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/ADD.1 7. 
130 So too the ICJ: Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 142. 
131 Cf Jean Salmon in Corten and Klein (n 121) Art 26 para 53. 
132 Cf Oliver Dörr in Dörr and Schmalenbach (n 118) Art 31 para 61; Jean-Marc Sorel 
and Valerie Bore-Eveno in Corten and Klein (n 121) Art 31 para 29; Richard K Gardiner, 
Treaty Interpretation, (OUP reprint 2011) 152 f; Jennings and Watts (n 39) 1272 in fn 7. 
133 Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) 
(Merits) [1991] ICJ Rep 69 f, citing the Admissions Advisory Opinion (n 65) 8; 
Gardiner (n 132) 159 f. 
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teleological interpretation,134 which could lead to unwritten (or implied) 
powers being read into treaties. However, based on the object and purpose 
of a treaty and a good faith interpretation of it, the favourable construction 
of a treaty can be achieved of upholding the treaty rather than destroying it 
(ut res magis valeat quam pereat).135 In most cases this will also align with 
the expectations of the signatory parties, and is a way of interpreting 
treaties with recourse to good faith. The ordinary meaning of the treaty and 
the prohibition of creating additional obligations place a limitation on the 
interpretation.136  
The obligation to interpret a treaty according to good faith finds its 
limitations in the creation of new obligations which are no longer covered 
either by the wording of the treaty or the intent of the signatories.137 The 
approach indicated by judicial practice aims to clear up ambiguous 
wording, yet not to act as a gap-filling function in order to create new 
obligations. 138  By advancing an interpretation that adds (or creates) 
obligations for another party, not intended or covered by the wording of the 
treaty, this party may be acting in bad faith.  
Even though an undoubted element of good faith pervades the 
interpretation of international agreements, the ICJ has not yet interpreted a 
treaty based solely on good faith.139  Therefore, it is submitted that, while 
the ICJ has an undoubtedly well-crafted canon of interpretation that it can 
draw on,140 the principle of good faith is also of an interstitial nature when 
it comes to treaty interpretation. In this regard it functions as a principle 
                                                
134 Jean-Marc Sorel and Valerie Bore-Eveno in Corten and Klein (n 121) Art. 31 para 
52. The ICJ did, albeit reluctantly, expressed elements of effet utile in: Interpretation of 
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Advisory Opinion, Second 
Phase) [1950] ICJ Rep 228 f. 
135 Gardiner (n 132) 160. 
136Interpretation of Peace Treaties (n 134) 226-230; Oliver Dörr in Dörr and 
Schmalenbach (n 118) Art 31 para 58; Matthias Herdegen, ‘Interpretation in 
International Law‘ in MPEPIL (February 2010, online edn) para 30, available at 
www.mpepil.com. 
137 Gardiner (n 132) para 155; Herdegen (n 136) para 30. 
138 Cf The Venezuelan Preferential Claims Case (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
Venezuela et al) (Award) [1904] IX RIAA 110; Netherlands v France (Award, 
unofficial transcript) [1976] available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1156, paras 54-79; R v Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport ex parte European Roma Rights Centre [2004] 2 AC 1, 19 (HL); Gardiner (n 
132) 157 f. 
139Cf Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the ICJ 1960-1989: Part Three (1991) 
62 British Ybk Intl L 17. 
140 In Art. 31-33 VCLT; cf Thirlway (n 139) 16 f. 
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lending contours without imposing specific obligations141 or creating a 
specific means of constructing a treaty based on good faith alone. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, good faith as a general principle of law is familiar from 
municipal law, but striking in its differences when assessed in the practice 
of international law. Having examined the specific aspects of good faith 
and how international jurisprudence has crafted justiciable concretisations 
out of a vague notion, one conclusion becomes very clear. Whether in 
general international law or in the law of treaties, good faith acts a 
limitation. The limitations that the observation of good faith places on 
States regulate the performance of rights and obligations in international 
discourse. As well as the explicit duties of good faith in treaty law, general 
international law places legal consequences on actions that are predicated 
on good faith.  
Returning to Fitzmaurice’s statement: while a rule answers ‘what’ 
and a principle answers ‘why’, the principle of good faith regulates 
‘how’.142 As international law becomes more fragmented and dispersed in 
‘self-contained’ regimes, the role of good faith will extend and create more 
permutations of this limitation, as, fundamentally, good faith acts to give 
legal value to the expectations that States have in the actions of other 
States. Good faith might therefore not be readily definable in abstract 
terms, it is however indispensable.  
                                                
141 MK Yasseen, ‘L'interprétation des traités d'après la Convention de Vienna sur le 
droit des traités’ (1976) 151 Receuil des Cours 21. 
142 Fitzmaurice (n 6) 7, and part 0. 
